The short bilateral meeting – a first one too – between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladeshi Interim Cabinet Chief Mohammed Yunus, held on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit, grabbed more eyeballs than the proceedings of the summit itself. This meeting was not just about two leaders of the region using an opportunity to discuss outstanding issues, but rather a cooling-off moment for the two neighbours whose relationship status would read ‘complicated’. Evidently, much water has flown between the two states in the past eight months, since Sheikh Hasina fled Dhaka and sought refuge in India on August 5 last year. Certainly, a few other official bilateral meetings have taken place over the past few months, but given that India had earlier refused Yunus’s requests for a chat with PM Modi, this latest one in Bangkok begs a few questions.
Was the meeting a reconciliation of sorts? Or was it about keeping up with the pretence of having normal ties? Or, did some larger calculations necessitate the photo-op opportunity? The change in Indian mood is curious, especially in the background of another controversy Yunus created with his statement. Last week, Yunus said during an event in China that because India’s Northeast was “landlocked”, Bangladesh was the primary gateway for the region’s maritime access and that it could be “an extension of the Chinese economy”. Not only was this factually incorrect, but the Bangladeshi invitation to China to build an airbase in Lalmonirhat district close to India’s Siliguri corridor is a rather contentious gesture, to say the least. The suggestion is sure to have raised eyebrows in the US, too, as it effectively draws Bangladesh into the Indo-Pacific strategic space. In any case, in the post-Hasina phase, India’s limited engagement and the US’s shifting priorities have indeed spawned the risk of deeper Chinese engagement in Bangladesh.
Was India Late To Act?
Since Yunus took over as interim head on August 8 last year, India has found it difficult to cope with the changed political landscape in Bangladesh. The shock of losing its best partner in the neighbourhood brought forth several severe implications, as the subsequent few months revealed. While India ultimately acknowledged that it had understood Hasina was losing popular mandate in her fight with the students, it couldn’t influence any change of track in Dhaka.
For the past few years, especially after the controlled January 2024 general election, there had been signals galore about Hasina losing touch with the ground realities as she increasingly tightened her administrative grip. But India still hoped that she would be able to hang in through the last tethers. Ultimately, however, a Dhaka sans Hasina left a gaping hole in the wall for India. It also failed to build any linkages with the new dispensation. The rule of the mob on the streets of Dhaka and visible domestic instability provided easy material to many Indian sections, too, to build their negative narrative.
Yunus’s inability to govern his country, given the law-and-order breakdown, and, more importantly, the large-scale violence unleashed on the country’s Hindu minorities, provided a linear view to India to judge the new dispensation. Add to that the tirade against the Awami League in Bangladesh alongside a growing presence of religious elements nationwide, and raging war cries about an ‘Islamist takeover’ of Bangladesh populated the Indian discourse. Any attempt to support a fledgling interim cabinet that was trying to stabilise a rather difficult and volatile situation ceased to be an option. On the contrary, Bangladesh continued to be seen through an emotive lens of ‘it-can-only-be-downhill-from-now’. Hostile cries were equally shrill on both sides, especially from the media and political circles.
The Anti-India Hysteria
Several irritants over the years have continued to stress the India-Bangladesh relationship, despite its firm foundations. This includes a water-sharing agreement over the Teesta river, border action against civilians from both sides, and, most importantly, a growing perception in Bangladesh that most bilateral agreements between the two nations favoured India more. That perception was rooted in Hasina’s style of politics, where policies were decided without any public debate and discussion, given the absence of a real opposition from the parliament.
All this added to the anti-India hysteria in Bangladesh and invariably led to youth groups suggesting a review of some of these decisions, widening the trust deficit further. The Hasina government had grown increasingly disconnected from the country’s youth, and Hasina herself had failed to tackle the criticism coming her way (though even at present, the Bangladesh polity seems to be showing slivers of similar intolerant behaviour). Dhaka’s strong diplomatic overtures to Pakistan and China also added to misgivings.
Dhaka’s Strengthening Outreach
While certain quarters in India see the recent meeting as an acceptance of the Yunus government’s style of politics, the meeting itself is unlikely to change the course of the present state of bilateral ties. It serves a different purpose: the goal is not to embrace the Yunus government but to perhaps ensure that Bangladesh does not turn into a neighbour that is exploited by hostile forces.
Going forward, the issue of the extradition of Sheikh Hasina from India will remain a sticky point, given the complex legalities involved in such a case. Both India and Bangladesh will have to find a modus vivendi to overcome their differing positions.
Overall, the Modi-Yunus meeting should be seen as a good gesture, and nothing more. The bilateral frank conversations were a useful exercise as India’s main objective is to see Bangladesh move forward towards inclusive multiparty elections and usher in a stable democratic government. But it will be a long haul till then. Political witch-hunting will have to stop, while various political stakeholders will have to converge on a common path before free and fair elections can be held. Evidently, there is a Bangladesh beyond Hasina, and only Indian support, not censure, can shape stable and fruitful bilateral ties in the days ahead.
(Professor, Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
